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Abstract
In the present work, we study the advertising compe-
tition of several marketing campaigns who need to de-
termine how many resources to allocate to potential
customers to advertise their products through direct
marketing while taking into account that competing
marketing campaigns are trying to do the same. Po-
tential customers rank marketing campaigns accord-
ing to the offers, promotions or discounts made to
them. Taking into account the intrinsic value of po-
tential customers as well as the peer influence that
they exert over other potential customers we consider
the network value as a measure of their importance
in the market and we find an analytical expression
for it.
We analyze the marketing campaigns competition
from a game theory point of view, finding a closed
form expression of the symmetric equilibrium offer
strategy for the marketing campaigns from which
no campaign has any incentive to deviate. We also
present several scenarios, such as Winner-takes-all
and Borda, but not the only possible ones for which
our results allow us to retrieve in a simple way the
corresponding equilibrium strategy.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the internet age, direct marketing, which pro-
motes a product or service exclusively to potential
customers likely to be profitable, has brought the at-
tention of marketing campaigns replacing in some in-
stances and complementing in others the traditional
mass marketing which promotes a product or service
indiscriminately to all potential customers.
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In the context of direct marketing, Domingos and
Richardson [1, 2] considered the network value of a
customer by incorporating the influence of peers on
the decision making process of potential customers
deciding between different products or services pro-
moted by competing marketing campaigns. If each
potential customer makes a buying decision indepen-
dently of every other potential customer, we should
only consider his intrinsic value, i.e. the expected
profit from sales to him. However, when we consider
the often strong influence potential customers exert
on their peers, friends, etc., we have to incorporate
this influence to their network value.
Most of the existing state of the art considers
that there is an incumbent that holds the market
and a challenger who needs to allocate advertisement
through direct marketing for certain individuals at
a given cost of adoption to promote the challenger
product or service. However, the cost of adoption is
unknown for most potential customers.
In the present work, our focus is on how many
resources to allocate to potential customers, while
knowing that competing marketing campaigns are do-
ing the same, for them to adopt one marketing cam-
paign versus another. We are interested on the sce-
nario when several competing marketing campaigns
need to simultaneously and independently decide how
many resources to allocate to potential customers to
advertise their products while most of the state-of-
the-art focus in only one marketing campaign (the
non-simultaneous case is also analyzed). The process
and dynamics by which influence is spread is given
by the voter model.
1.1 Related Works
The general problem of influence maximization was
first introduced by Domingos and Richardson [1, 2].
Based on the results of Nemhauser et al. [3], Kempe et
al. [4, 5] provided a greedy (1−1/e−ε)-approximation
algorithm for the spread maximizing set. A slightly
different model but with similar flavor, the voter
model, was introduced by Clifford and Sudbury [6]
and Holley and Liggett [7]. In that model of social
networks, Even-Dar and Shapira [8] found an exact
solution to the spread maximization set. In this work,
we focus on this model of social networks since even if
the solutions are not always simple, we can find them
explicitly.
Competitive influence in social networks has been
studied in other scenarios. Bharathi et al. [9] pro-
posed a generalization of the independent cascade
model of social networks and gave a (1−1/e) approx-
imation algorithm for computing the best response
to an already known opponent’s strategy. Sanjeev
and Kearns [10] studied the case of two players si-
multaneously choosing some nodes to initially seed
while considering two independent functions for the
consumers denoted switching function and selection
function. Borodin et al. [11] showed that for a broad
family of competitive influence models is NP-hard
to achieve an approximation that is better that the
square root of the optimal solution. Chasparis and
Shamma [12] found optimal advertising policies using
dynamic programming on some particular models of
social networks.
Within the general context of competitive contests,
there is an extensive literature (see e.g. [13, 14, 15,
16]). To study competitive contests, we use recent ad-
vances of game theory, and in particular of Colonel
Blotto games. The Colonel Blotto game, was first
solved for the case of two generals and three battle-
fields by Borel [17, 18]. For the case of equally valued
battlefields, also known as homogeneous battlefields
case, this result was generalized for any number of
battlefields by Gross and Wagner [13]. Gross [19]
proved the existence and a method to construct the
joint probability distribution. Laslier and Picard [20]
provided alternative methods to construct the joint
distribution by extending the method proposed by
Gross and Wagner [13]. Roberson [14] focused on the
case of two generals, homogeneous battlefields and
different budgets (also known as asymmetric budgets
case). Friedman [21] studied the Nash equilibrium
and best response function for the asymmetric bud-
gets case with two generals. The case of two generals
and where for each distinct value there are at least
three battlefields with the same value was stated and
solved by Roberson [22] and Shwartz et al. [23]. In the
context of voting systems, Myerson [24] found the so-
lution for the case for equally valued battlefields with
ranking scores for any number of candidates.
The plan of this work is as follows. In Section 2
we describe the model that we are considering. In
Section 3 we give the main results that we have ob-
tained. In Section 4 we give simulations on some
scenarios and in Section 5 we conclude and describe
future extensions of our work.
2 MODEL
Consider the set of marketing cam-
paigns K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} that need to allocate
a certain budget, denoted by B, across a set of
potential customers V = {1, 2, . . . , N} through offers
(or promotions or discounts). Each potential cus-
tomer indicates his preferences through a ranking
(defined in the following subsection) of the K
products or services promoted by the marketing
campaigns. For n ∈ V , we denote by wn the intrinsic
value of potential customer n and by W =
∑
n∈V wn
the total intrinsic value of the set of potential
customers. Similarly, we denote by vn the network
value (to be determined) of potential customer n ∈ V
and by V =
∑
n∈V vn the total network value of the
set of potential customers.
To avoid specifying the number of potential cus-
tomers and dealing with the complexities of large fi-
nite numbers, we consider the number of potential
customers to be essentially infinite. We should, how-
ever, interpret such an infinite model as an approxi-
mation to a large finite population with hundreds or
thousands of potential customers. We assume that
campaigns’ offers are independent across individual
potential customers, so that no potential customer’s
offers have any specific relationship with any other
set of potential customers’ offers. This offers’ inde-
pendence assumption greatly simplifies our analysis,
because it allows us to completely characterize a mar-
keting campaign’s promises by the marginal distri-
bution of his offers to potential customers, without
saying anything more about the joint distribution of
offers to various sets of potential customers. The
infinite-population assumption (suggested and used
in [24]) was introduced above essentially only to jus-
tify this simplifying assumption of offers’ indepen-
dence across potential customers.
Each marketing campaign’s budget constraint is
expressed as a constraint on the average offer per
potential customer that a marketing campaign can
promise. Specifically, we assume here that each mar-
keting campaign’s offer distribution for potential cus-
tomer n must have mean Bvn/V to be considered
credible by potential customer n. The reason is that
budget B should be allocated across N potential cus-
tomers and each potential customer n has relative
value vn/V .
With a finite population of N potential customers,
and with a fixed budget of B dollars to be allocated,
marketing campaign promises could not be indepen-
dent across all potential customers, because the of-
fers to all potential customers would have to sum
the given budget B. However, due to Kolmogorov’s
strong law of large numbers, as the number of po-
tential customers N increases, the sum of indepen-
dently distributed offers with high probability will
converge to the budget B. Indeed, if the mean of
the campaign’s offer distribution for potential cus-
tomer n ∈ V is given by Bvn/V and the support of
the distribution is bounded then, for any small posi-
tive number ε, N potential customers’ offers that are
drawn independently from the campaign’s distribu-
tion would have probability less than ε of totalling
more than (1 + ε)
∑
n∈V Bvn/V = B(1 + ε), when
N is sufficiently large. Thus, taking the limit as the
population goes to infinity, we can assume that each
campaign makes independent offers to every poten-
tial customer and the budget constraint will hold with
high probability.
The potential customers and their influence rela-
tionships can be modeled as an undirected graph with
self-loops G = (V , E) where V is the set of nodes which
represent the potential customers and E is the set of
edges which represent the mutual influence between
potential customers.
Notation
Part of the notation is summarized in Table 1. We
denote by |A| the cardinality of set A. We denote by
index k one of the marketing campaigns and by index
−k the competing (or set of competing) marketing
campaign(s) to k. For a potential customer n ∈ V , we
denote by N (n) the set of neighbors of n in graph G,
i.e. N (n) = {m ∈ V : {n,m} ∈ E}.
2.1 Normalized rank-scoring rules
We consider that each potential customer ranks
the set of marketing campaigns K in order of
their offers to her. We assume a normal-
ized rank-scoring rule characterized by an or-
dered sequence of K numbers, which we denote
by s1, s2, . . . , sK , where s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sK = 0 and
such that
∑K
k=1 sk = 1. We consider that each
potential customer n ∈ V distributes her value vn
across marketing campaigns according to this nor-
malized rank-scoring rule s = (s1, s2, . . . , sK) as fol-
lows: vns = (vns1, vns2, . . . , vnsK). Thus, potential
customer n ∈ V gives the top-ranked marketing cam-
paign vns1 points, the second-ranked marketing cam-
paign vns2, and so on, with the kth ranked market-
ing campaign getting vnsk for all k ∈ K. There-
fore, the payoff distributed is indeed
∑K
k=1 vnsk =
vn
∑K
k=1 sk = vn where the last equality is coming
from the normalization of the rank-scores. Each mar-
keting campaign’s payoff corresponds to the sum of
the payoffs across all potential customers.
The previous assumption is not restrictive. Given
any rank-scoring rule, where s1, s2, . . . , sK , are not
all equal and without loss of generality s1 ≥ s2 ≥
. . . ≥ sK , it can be normalized to fulfill the previous
statement. Indeed, let S =
∑K
j=1(sj − sK). We ob-
serve that we can normalize the rank-scoring rule as
follows (s′1, s
′
2, . . . , s
′
K) = (
s1−sK
S ,
s2−sK
S , . . . ,
sK−sK
S )
so that s′K = 0 and the sum of the rank-scores S
′ is
equal to 1.
2.2 Intrinsic payoff function
We assume that the intrinsic value of potential cus-
tomer n ∈ V is given by wn ≤ U with U finite and
we denote by w = (w1, w2, . . . , wN ) the vector of in-
trinsic values of potential customers. We consider the
matrix of offers of marketing campaigns to potential
customers, denoted by X = (xk,n), where xk,n cor-
responds to the offer of marketing campaign k ∈ K
to potential customer n ∈ V . We denote by xk,· =
(xk,1, xk,2, . . . , xk,N ) the vector of offers of marketing
campaign k ∈ K. We consider the matrix of offers to
potential customers but only of the competing mar-
keting campaigns to k, denoted by X−k,·.
For potential customer n ∈ V , we consider a rank-
ing function un : K → {1, 2, . . . ,K} which maps a
given marketing campaign k to its ranking given by
that potential customer. For example, if market-
ing campaign k is the top-ranked marketing cam-
paign and k′ is the third-ranked marketing campaign
for potential customer n ∈ V then un(k) = 1 and
un(k
′) = 3.
The intrinsic payoff function for marketing cam-
paign k is given by
piINTk (xk,·,X−k,·,w) =
N∑
n=1
wnsun(k), (1)
Table 1: Notation
V = {1, 2, . . . , N} Set of potential customers
K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} Set of marketing campaigns
B Total budget of marketing campaigns
wn Intrinsic value of potential customer n
vn Network value of potential customer n
W =
∑
n∈V wn Total intrinsic value of potential customers
V =
∑
n∈V vn Total network value of potential customers
G = (V , E) Graph of influence relationships
M Normalized transition matrix of G
(s1, s2, . . . , sK) such that
Normalized rank-scoring rules1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sK = 0,∑
j∈K sj = 1
xk,n Offer of campaign k to customer n
xk,· Vector of offers of marketing campaign k
X = {xk,n}k∈K,n∈V Matrix of offers
X−k,· Matrix of offers of competing campaigns
piINT Intrinsic payoff function
pi (Network) payoff function
utn(·) Ranking function
f0(·) Initial preferences
f t(·) Preferences at time t
where sun(k) corresponds to the rank-score given by
potential customer n for the ranking of marketing
campaign k. We observe that sun(k) depends only on
the offers made to potential customer n.
2.3 Evolution of the system
We consider that time is slotted and without loss of
generality we consider that the initial time t0 = 0.
We consider the function f0 : V → KK which maps
a potential customer n ∈ V to her initial preferences
f0(n) = (f01 (n), f
0
2 (n), . . . , f
0
K(n)) where f
0
1 (n) corre-
sponds to her initial top-ranked marketing campaign,
f02 (n) corresponds to her initial second-ranked mar-
keting campaign, and so on. Similarly, for t ≥ 1
we consider function f t : V → KK which maps a po-
tential customer n ∈ V to her preferences at time t,
denoted by f t(n) = (f t1(n), f
t
2(n), . . . , f
t
K(n)), where
f t1(n) corresponds to her top-ranked marketing cam-
paign at time t, f t2(n) corresponds to her second-
ranked marketing campaign at time t, and so on.
The evolution of the system will be described by
the voter model. Starting from any arbitrary ini-
tial preference assignment by the potential customers
of G, at each time t ≥ 1, each potential customer
picks uniformly at random one of his neighbors and
adopts his opinion. Equivalently, f t(j) = f t−1(j′)
with probability 1/|N (j)| if j′ ∈ N (j).
Similarly to the previous subsection, for t ≥ 0
and potential customer n ∈ V , we consider function
utn : K → {1, 2, . . . ,K} which for a given marketing
campaign k ∈ K gives you the ranking of the market-
ing campaign for potential customer n at time t.
We are interested on the network value of a poten-
tial customer. Following the steps of [15], in the next
section we compute this value.
3 RESULTS
3.1 Network value of a customer
We notice that in the voter model described in the
previous section, the probability that potential cus-
tomer j adopts the opinion of one her neighbors j′
is precisely 1/|N (j)|. Equivalently, this is the prob-
ability that a random walk of length 1 that starts
at j ends up in j′. Generalizing this observation by
induction on t, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Even-Dar and Shapira [8]). Let ptj,j′
denote the probability that a random walk of length t
starting at potential customer j stops at potential cus-
tomer j′. Then the probability that after t iterations
of the voter model, potential customer j will adopt the
opinion that potential customer j′ had at time t = 0
is precisely ptj,j′ .
By linearity of expectation, the expected network
payoff for marketing campaign k ∈ K at target time
τ , denoted by piτk , is given by
piτk =
∑
j∈V
∑
j′∈V
wjp
τ
j,j′suτ
j′
(k).
Let M be the normalized transition matrix of G,
i.e., M(j, j′) = 1/|N (j)| if j′ ∈ N (j) and zero other-
wise. The probability that a random walk of length τ
starting at j ends in j′ is given by the (j, j′)-entry of
the matrix M τ . Then
piτk =
∑
j∈V
∑
j′∈V
wjM
τ (j, j′)suτ
j′
(k).
Therefore, the expected network payoff is given by
piτk =
∑
j′∈V
vj′suτ
j′
(k), (2)
where the network value of potential customer j′ at
target time τ is given by
vj′ =
∑
j∈V
wjM
τ (j, j′).
We can formalize this in the following statement.
Theorem 1. Under the rank-scoring rule with nor-
malized ranking points (s1, s2, . . . , sK) and intrinsic
values (w1, w2, . . . , wN ), the network value of poten-
tial customer j′ at target time τ is given by
vj′ =
∑
j∈V
wjM
τ (j, j′),
where M is the normalized transition matrix of G.
We notice that both eqns. (1) and (2) are similar.
The only difference is that one considers the intrin-
sic value and the other the network value (given by
Theorem 1) of potential customers. From eqns. (1)
and (2), we obtain that after determining the net-
work value of potential customers, the problem of
determining the resource allocation that maximizes
the expected network payoff is similar to the prob-
lem of determining the resource allocation that max-
imizes the expected intrinsic payoff. Therefore, in the
following we restrict ourselves to this problem.
3.2 Non-simultaneous allocations
In this subsection, we prove that the intrinsic payoff
problem is easy to solve in the case where one market-
ing campaign can observe what competing marketing
campaigns are offering and after that makes offers to
potential customers. Indeed, even in the case of two
marketing campaigns, if marketing campaign 2 could
make offers after observing the offers made by mar-
keting campaign 1, then marketing campaign 2 will
always be preferred by the most valuable potential
customers. For example, marketing campaign 2 could
identify a small group of potential customers who are
the least valuable between those who are promised
strictly positive offers by marketing campaign 1 (e.g.
the 5% of the distribution of marketing campaign 1),
and offer nothing to this group. Then campaign 2
could offer to every other potential customer slightly
more than campaign 1 has promised him, where the
excess over campaign 1’s offers is financed from the
resources not given to the potential customers in the
first group. Every potential customer outside of the
first small group (5%) would prefer marketing cam-
paign 2, who would win 95% of the most valuable po-
tential customers. To avoid this simple outcome, we
assume that both of the marketing campaigns must
make their marketing campaign promises simultane-
ously. (We may think of scenarios in which it is im-
portant to make the first offers and in which there is
a cost of delay by the response to the first offers, but
those scenarios are outside the scope of this work.)
3.3 Family of scalable probability dis-
tributions
We seek a solution that can be written as a family of
offer probability distributions with a scaling param-
eter. We want that offers scale with the value (in-
trinsic or network value depending on the context)
of the potential customers. However, essentially we
look for an offer distribution that has the same shape
relative to this value. We consider that the represen-
tative offer distribution F (the offer distribution with
scale value 1) has a probability density function f in
a bounded support I. From the fundamental theo-
rem of calculus, we have the following. Let I ⊆ R
be an interval and ϕ : [a1, b1] → I be a continuously
differentiable function. Suppose that f : I → R is a
continuous function. Then
∫ ϕ(b1)
ϕ(a1)
f(x) dx =
∫ b1
a1
f(ϕ(t))ϕ′(t) dt.
For potential customer n ∈ V , we use function
ϕ(x) = x/vn which is continuosly differentiable and
scales the offers by a factor vn and therefore if the
probability density function of the representative of-
fer density f(x) has support [a, b] the scaled offer
density is given by f(x/vn)/vn and it has support
[vna, vnb].
We may represent marketing campaign k’s cumula-
tive offer distribution by a family of probability distri-
butions, with representative cumulative offer distri-
bution F k(x; a, b), where F kn (x) = F
k(x/vn; vna, vnb)
denotes the fraction of potential customers to whom
marketing campaign k will offer less than value x.
Each offer distribution for potential customer n ∈ V
must have mean Bvn/V and so F
k
n must be a non-
decreasing function that satisfies∫ ∞
0
x dF kn (x) = Bvn/V,
as well as F kn (x) = 0 ∀x ≤ 0, and
lim
x→+∞
F kn (x) = 1.
3.4 Symmetric equilibrium
A symmetric equilibrium of the marketing campaign
competition is a scenario in which every marketing
campaign is expected to use the same offer distribu-
tion, and each marketing campaign finds that using
this offer distribution maximizes its chances of win-
ning when the other marketing campaigns are also
simultaneously and independently allocating their of-
fers according to this distribution (and all potential
customers perceive that the K marketing campaigns
have the same probability of winning the market). In
this work, we focus exclusively on finding such sym-
metric equilibria.
In the following, we prove that there is a symmetric
equilibrium which corresponds to a family of proba-
bility distributions with scale parameter vn for po-
tential customer n ∈ V . Let F (x) = F (x; a, b) denote
the representative cumulative distribution function
acting as the equilibrium strategy and let Fn(x) :=
F (x/vn; vna, vnb) denote the cumulative distribution
function representing the equilibrium offer distribu-
tion for potential customer n ∈ V . Fn(x) denotes
the cumulative probability that a given potential cus-
tomer n will be offered less than x by any other given
marketing campaign, according to this equilibrium
distribution.
Consider the situation faced by a given market-
ing campaign k when it chooses its offer distribution,
assuming that every other marketing campaign will
use the equilibrium offer distribution. When market-
ing campaign k offers x to potential customer n, the
probability that this marketing campaign k will be
ranked in position j by potential customer n is given
by P (j, Fn(x)) where we let
P (j, q) =
(
K − 1
j − 1
)
qK−j(1 − q)j−1.
That is, P (j, q) denotes the probability that exactly
j−1 of theK−1 competing marketing campaigns will
offer more than x, given that each other marketing
campaign has an independent probability q of offering
less than x to this potential customer. Equivalently,
P (j, q) denotes the probability that exactly K − j of
the K − 1 competing marketing campaigns will offer
less than x.
If marketing campaign k offers x to potential cus-
tomer n, then the expected value that this poten-
tial customer will give to this marketing campaign is
Rn(Fn(x)) where
Rn(q) = vn
K∑
j=1
P (j, q)sj .
Things could be more difficult if there were a pos-
itive probability of other marketing campaigns offer-
ing exactly x, but we can ignore such complications
because we will prove (see Lemma 1) that the equilib-
rium distribution cannot assign positive probability
to any single point. When all marketing campaigns
independently use the same offer distribution, they
must all get the same expected score from potential
customer n which must equal vn/K.
Theorem 2. In a K-marketing campaign com-
petition under the normalized rank-scoring rule
(s1, s2, . . . , sK) and values (v1, v2, . . . , vN ), there is a
unique scalable symmetric equilibrium of the market-
ing campaigns’ offer-distribution game. In this equi-
librium, each marketing campaign chooses to gener-
ate offers according to a family of probability distri-
butions, with scale parameter vn for potential cus-
tomer n, that has support on the interval from 0 to
s1KBvn/V , and which has a cumulative distribution
F (·) that satisfies the equation
x = Rn(Fn(x))/(V/KB), ∀x ∈ [0, s1KBvn/V ].
The proof follows the steps of Theorem 2 in [24].
The following is a constructive proof and we decom-
pose the proof in the next following lemmas.
Lemma 1. If there is a symmetric equilibrium distri-
bution of offers, it must be continuous, i.e. it cannot
have any points of positive probability.
Proof. If all marketing campaigns used a representa-
tive offer distribution F (·) that assigned a positive
probability δ to some point x > 0, then there would
be a positive fraction δK of potential customers who
would be exactly indifferent among the marketing
campaigns since they receive from each of them the
same offer. Any marketing campaign could then in-
crease his average point score among this group by
giving an arbitrarily small increase (say, ε) to most
of the potential customers to whom he was going to
offer x and the cost of this increase could be financed
by moving an arbitrarily small fraction of this group
down to zero. In other words, if the offer distribution
had a positive mass at some point, then a market-
ing campaign could gain a positive group of potential
customers by a transfer of resources that would lower
his score from only an arbitrarily small number of
potential customers.
Lemma 2. We have that
Rn(0) = sKvn = 0, Rn(1) = s1vn,
and Rn(·) is a continuous and strictly increasing
function over the interval from 0 to 1.
Proof. These equations hold because P (j, 0) equals 0
unless j equals K, P (j, 1) equals 0 unless j equals
1, and P (K, 0) = 1 = P (1, 1). Continuity of Rn(·)
follows directly from the formulas, because Rn(q) is
polynomial in q. Let us show that Rn(·) is increasing.
First, we verify that
Rn(q) = vn
K∑
j=2
(sj−1 − sj)
∑
m<j
P (m, q),
using sK = 0. We observe that
∑
m<j P (m, q) de-
notes the probability that more than K − j other
marketing campaigns have made offers in an inter-
val of probability q, and this probability must be a
strictly increasing function of q. The ordering of the
sj values guarantees that at least one term in this
Rn(q) expression must have a positive (sj−1− sj) co-
efficient, and none can be negative. Therefore Rn(·)
is an increasing function.
Lemma 3. The lowest permissible offer 0 must be in
the support of the equilibrium distribution of offers.
Proof. The main idea is that, if the minimum of the
support were strictly greater than zero, then a mar-
keting campaign would be devoting positive resources
to potential customers near the minimum of the sup-
port of the distribution. He would expect to get al-
most no value (sK = 0) from these potential cus-
tomers, because all other marketing campaigns would
almost surely be promising them more. Thus, it
would be better to reduce the offers to 0 for most
of these potential customers in order to make serious
offers for at least some of them.
The above argument can be formalized as follows.
Because, as we have shown before, there are no points
of positive probability, the cumulative offer distribu-
tion Fn(·) for potential customer n is continuous. Let
z denote the minimum of the support of the equilib-
rium offer distribution for potential customer n, so
Fn(z) = 0 but Fn(z + ε) > 0 for all positive ε. Now,
select any fixed y such that y > z and Fn(y) > 0.
For any ε such that 0 < ε < y − z, a marketing
campaign might consider deviating from the equilib-
rium by promising either y or 0 to each potential
customer n in the group of potential customers whom
he was supposed to offer between z and (z + ε), ac-
cording to his Fn-distributed random-offer generator.
The potential customers in this group were going to
be given offers that averaged some amount between
z and (z + ε), so he can offer y dollars to at least
a z/y fraction of these potential customers without
changing his offers to any other potential customer.
Among this z/y fraction of the group, he would get
an average point score of Rn(Fn(y)), by outbidding
the other marketing campaigns who are using the
Fn distribution; so the deviation would get him an
average point score of at least (z/y)Rn(Fn(y)) from
this group of potential customers (the potential cus-
tomers moved down to zero in this deviation would
give him sKvn = 0 points). If he follows the equilib-
rium, however, he gets at most Rn(Fn(z + ε)) as his
average point score from this group of potential cus-
tomers. So to deter such a deviation, we must have
(z/y)Rn(Fn(y)) ≤ Rn(Fn(z + ε)), and so
z ≤ y
Rn(Fn(z + ε))
Rn(Fn(y))
.
But Rn(Fn(z + ε)) goes to Rn(Fn(z)) = Rn(0) = 0
as ε goes to 0, and so z must equal 0.
Lemma 4. There is some positive constant α such
that
Rn(Fn(x)) = αx.
Proof. Let x and y be any two numbers in the sup-
port of the equilibrium distribution for potential cus-
tomer n such that 0 < x < y. A marketing campaign
could deviate by taking a group of potential cus-
tomers to whom he is supposed to give offers close
to x, according to his equilibrium plan, and instead
he could give them offers close to y to an x/y fraction
of this group and he could offer 0 to the remaining
(1 − x/y) fraction. Because the support of the rep-
resentative distribution contains 0 as well as x and
y, neither this self-financing deviation nor its reverse
(offering close to x to a group of potential customers
of whom an x/y fraction were supported get close to
y, and the remaining (1−x/y) fraction were supposed
to get close to 0) should increase the marketing cam-
paign’s expected average point score from this group
of potential customers. Thus, we must have
Rn(Fn(x)) = (x/y)Rn(Fn(y)) + (1− x/y)Rn(Fn(0)).
But Rn(Fn(0)) = Rn(0) = 0, so we obtain
Rn(Fn(x))
x
=
Rn(Fn(y))
y
,
for all x and y in the support of the equilibrium of-
fer distribution for potential customer n. So there
is some positive constant α such that, for all x in
the support of the offer distribution for potential cus-
tomer n, Rn(Fn(x)) = αx.
Lemma 5. We have that the constant α = V/KB.
Proof. The mean offer must equal Bvn/V under the
Fn distribution, therefore∫ s1vn/α
0
x dFn(x) = B
vn
V
.
We also know that a marketing campaign who uses
the same offer distribution Fn as all the other mar-
keting campaigns must expect the average point score
vn/K, so
vn
K
=
∫ s1vn/α
0
Rn(Fn(x)) dFn(x) =
∫ s1vn/α
0
αxdFn(x)
= αB
vn
V
.
From the previous lemma, the support of the
Fn distribution is the interval from 0 to s1vn/α =
s1KBvn/V , and the cumulative distribution satisfies
the formula
Rn(Fn(x)) =
V
KB
x, ∀x ∈ [0, s1KBvn/V ].
Lemma 6. Fn is an equilibrium.
Proof. In general, for any nonnegative x, we have
Rn(Fn(x)) ≤
V
KBx, because when x > s1KBvn/V
Rn(Fn(x)) = Rn(1) = s1vn <
V
KBx. So using any
other distribution Gn, that has mean Bvn/V for po-
tential customer n ∈ V and is on the nonnegative
numbers, would give to a marketing campaign an ex-
pected score
∫ ∞
0
Rn(Fn(x)) dGn(x) ≤
∫ ∞
0
V
KB
xdGn(x)
=
V
KB
∫ ∞
0
x dGn(x) =
vn
K
,
with equality if the support of Gn is contained in
the interval [0, s1KBvn/V ]. Thus, no marketing
campaign can increase his expected score by devi-
ating from Fn to some other distribution, when all
other marketing campaigns are using the distribu-
tion Fn.
Lemmas 1-6 are the proof of Theorem 2. The pre-
vious theorem provides us a method to obtain explic-
itly the cumulative offer distribution functions under
different ranking-scores.
4 SIMULATIONS
Winner-takes-all
We notice that our problem is more general than a
simple pairwise competition between marketing cam-
paigns. For the pairwise competition there already
exists a solution (see e.g. [23]). However, a pairwise
competition is not always what is needed. For ex-
ample, consider the case when each customer chooses
only one marketing campaign to buy a product (it
could be for example buying a house, in which most
of the potential customers will buy only one house).
To see this, consider the example of three competing
marketing campaigns X , Y , and Z and five equally
valuable customers (for the sake of simplification).
Consider the pure strategies
x = (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2),
y = (0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5, 0.5),
z = (0.5, 0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0).
In that case, the pairwise competition gives that mar-
keting campaign X captures 3 out of 5 potential cus-
tomers to Y (the first three), and that X captures 3
out of 5 potential customers to Z (the last three), thus
winning in a pairwise competition against both mar-
keting competitors. However, since each customer
will only choose one product, the final outcome will
be 2 customers for Y , 2 customers for Z, while only
1 customer for X .
The case where the objective is to be the first eval-
uated marketing campaign and being second does not
provide any value can be represented as follows:
s1 = 1, s2 = 0, . . . , sK = 0.
In that case Rn(q) = vnP (1, q) = vnq
K−1. There-
fore from Theorem 2 the equilibrium cumulative dis-
tribution satisfies
x = (F (x))K−1KBvn/V, ∀x ∈ [0,KBvn/V ],
and thus
F (x) =
(
x
KBvn/V
)1/(K−1)
, ∀x ∈ [0,KBvn/V ].
When K = 2 we recover the result of [23] for pair-
wise competition. It is also interesting to notice the
similarity between this solution and the character-
ization of the solution for an all-pay auction with
one object [25]. We notice that there is a tight rela-
tionship between this scenario, Colonel Blotto games
and auctions. A Colonel Blotto game can be seen as
a simultaneous all-pay auction of multiple items of
complete information. An all-pay auction is an auc-
tion in which every bidder must forfeit its bid regard-
less of whether it wins the object which is awarded
to the highest bidder. It is an auction of complete
information since the value of the object is known
to every bidder. In other contexts, this was already
noted by Szentes and Rosenthal [26], Roberson [14]
and Kvasov [27].
Figure 2(a) gives us the equilibrium offer distribu-
tion when we consider that the budget of each mar-
keting campaign is 1000 dollars for three different
competing scenarios:
• there are 2 marketing campaigns and the relative
value of a customer is vn/V = 1/20;
• there are 4 marketing campaigns and the relative
value of a customer is vn/V = 1/40;
• there are 6 marketing campaigns and the relative
value of a customer is vn/V = 1/60.
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Figure 1: Winner-takes-all equilibrium offer distri-
bution when we consider a budget of 1000 dollars,
K = 2 and vn/V = 1/20; K = 4 and vn/V = 1/40;
and K = 6 and vn/V = 1/60 (for them to have the
same support).
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Figure 2: Borda equilibrium offer distribution when
we consider a budget of 1000 dollars, K = 2, K =
4 and K = 6 and relative value vn/V = 1/20. We
notice that the equilibrium offer distribution of Borda
is independent of the number of competing marketing
campaigns.
The chosen parameters in the three scenarios allow
us to consider the same support of the offers distri-
butions.
We observe that when there are two competing
marketing campaigns, the equilibrium offers are made
uniformly at random over the support interval from
0 to 100 dollars. However, increasing the number
of competing marketing campaigns, we observe that
marketing campaigns offers are skewed offering less
than the average to most of the potential customers
while offering much more than the average for a re-
duced number of potential customers. In particular,
for four marketing campaigns, more than 50% of the
potential customers receive offers of less than 14 dol-
lars (the average offer is 25 dollars). This effect is
even more pronounced for six marketing campaigns
where more than 50% of potential customers receive
offers of less than 4 dollars (the average offer is 17
dollars).
Borda
Another interesting case is when the rank-scoring rule
is linearly decreasing with the ranking (we denote it
Borda for its similarity to Borda ranking votes). For
example, it can be given by
s1 =
(K − 1)
S
, s2 =
(K − 2)
S
, s3 =
(K − 3)
S
, . . . , sK = 0,
where S =
∑K
j=1 sj = K(K − 1)/2.
The function Rn(q) under that rule is given by
Rn(q) = vn
K∑
j=1
P (j, q)
2(K − j)
K(K − 1)
=
2vn
K
K∑
j=1
(
K − 1
j − 1
)
qK−j(1− q)j−1
K − j
K − 1
=
2vn
K
K′∑
j=0
(
K ′
j
)
qK
′
−j(1− q)j
(
1−
j
K ′
)
=
2vn
K
(
1−
K ′(1− q)
K ′
)
=
2vn
K
q
where we have made the change of variable K ′ =
K − 1 and use the formula of the expected value of a
binomial distribution.
Thus, by the previous theorem
V
KB
x =
2vn
K
F (x), ∀x ∈ [0, 2Bvn/V ].
Therefore,
F (x) =
x
2Bvn/V
∀x ∈ [0, 2Bvn/V ].
Therefore, the equilibrium offer distribution under
this rule is a uniform distribution over the interval
from 0 to 2Bvn/V . We notice that the equilibrium of-
fer distribution is independent of the number of com-
peting marketing campaigns K.
Figure 2(b) gives us the equilibrium offer distribu-
tion when we consider that the budget for each mar-
keting campaign is 1000 dollars, the relative value of
a customer is vn/V = 1/20 and we consider three
scenarios with K = 2, K = 4, and K = 6.
We observe that in these three scenarios the equi-
librium offer distribution is uniformly distributed
over the suppport interval from 0 to 100 dollars and
it is independent on the number of competing mar-
keting campaigns.
The previously considered scenarios, Winner-takes-
all and Borda, are two out of many possible scenarios
that can be analyzed and to which our previous re-
sults can be applied.
5 Conclusions
In this work, we studied advertising competitions in
social networks. In particular, we analyzed the sce-
nario of several marketing campaigns determining to
which potential customers to market and how many
resources to allocate to these potential customers
while taking into account that competing marketing
campaigns are trying to do the same.
As a consequence of social network dynamics, the
importance of every potential customer in the market
can be expressed in terms of her network value which
is a measure of the influence exerted among her peers
and friends and of which we provided an analytical
expression for the voter model of social networks.
Defining rank-scoring rules for potential customers
and using tools from game theory, we have given
a closed form expression of the symmetric equilib-
rium offer strategy for the marketing campaigns from
which no campaign has any interesting to deviate.
Moreover, we presented some interesting out of many
possible scenarios to which our results can be applied.
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